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Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and Competition Policy
Thomas L. Greaney
Of the many elements animating structural change under health reform, Accountable
Care Organizations (ACOs) have drawn the greatest attention. Supported by scholarship from
health policy experts and positioned as the Affordable Care Act‟s centerpiece for systemic
reform, the concept came to represent a potential cure-all for the disorders plaguing American
health care. While the program, entitled the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), focuses
on Medicare payment policy, its objectives extend much farther. The ACO strategy entails
regulatory interventions that at once aim to reshape the health care delivery system, improve
outcomes, promote adoption of evidence based medicine and supportive technology, and create a
platform for controlling costs under payment system reform.
Ambitious aims to be sure. Implementation, however, has proved a wrenching process.
Because the law entails seismic change requiring norm-shifting, institution building, and law
reform, interest groups did not remain quiescent. Moreover, the ACO strategy calls upon
disparate governmental entities to cooperate (and in many cases, cede regulatory turf) and asks
the private sector to respond responsibly to changes that are rife with possibilities for
opportunistic behavior. The regulatory undertaking itself is far reaching--perhaps
unprecedented--in its goal of “nation building”: fostering institutions that will counter market
failure and shift embedded incentives and practices in medicine. Given the abject state of health
care markets, a central question is whether implementing regulations and legal standards are
adequate to achieve the hoped-for rationalization of health care delivery and financing.
This article looks at the intersection of markets and regulation under the Affordable Care
Act. Specifically, it analyzes regulatory interventions under the MSSP designed to foster
commercial market competition. Assessing prospects for success, it advances several
interrelated arguments. First, in fulfilling the regulatory task of implementing the MSSP,
regulators needed to be vigilant to protect against the potential that ACOs may have adverse on
private markets. It finds that because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
was overly preoccupied with Medicare program issues and hyper-sensitive to criticism from
powerful hospitals, the agency missed an important opportunity in its implementing regulations
to prevent exacerbation of provider market power. Because existing legal regimes, especially
antitrust law, are severely constrained in their ability to deal with extant provider market power,
regulation of ACOs requires a cross-platform regulatory approach that addresses market issues.
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I.

ACOs: Theory and Implementation

The MSSP is one of several initiatives contained in the Affordable Care Act designed to
implement “value-based purchasing,” a reform strategy that “links payment more directly to the
quality of care provided [and] is a strategy that can help to transform the current payment
system by rewarding providers for delivering high quality, efficient clinical care.”1 Section 3022
of the ACA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish the MSSP to
encourage development of ACOs in Medicare.2 Although unmistakably designed to foster
change in coordinating patient care for Medicare beneficiaries, the ACO strategy has broader
goals. Donald Berwick, former Director of CMS, often repeated the “triple aim” of the MSSP:
(1) better care for individuals; (2) better health for populations; and (3) slower growth in costs
through improvements in care.3 The concept of promoting organizations capable of being
accountable for the quality and cost of the care they deliver, carries the endorsement of
MedPAC4 and a number of academic and policy experts,5 but is not entirely novel. In many
respects, the ACO is the latest in a long line of efforts to develop integrated delivery systems that
bear financial responsibility for treatment decisions.6 Distinguishing the MSSP from other
market-oriented strategies however is the program‟s objective of leveraging Medicare policy to
transform health delivery and payment practices in the private sector. This link is the source of
the program‟s considerable promise and its most vexing regulatory challenges.
The basic design of the MSSP enables provider organizations to share a percentage of the
savings they achieve in delivering services to Medicare beneficiaries provided they
1

CMS HOSPITAL PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE WORKGROUP ET AL., DEP‟T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES MEDICARE HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED
PURCHASING PLAN 1 (2007), available at
https://www.cms.gov/AcuteInpatientPPS/downloads/hospital_VBP_plan_issues_paper.pdf.
2
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 395 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA].
3
Donald M. Berwick, Launching Accountable Care Organizations—The Proposed Rule for the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. e32, e32 (2011).
4
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM
40-58 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf (MedPAC is an
independent Congressional Agency that advises Congress on issues affecting Medicare) [hereinafter
MedPAC Report].
5
Elliott S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward In Medicare, 28 HEALTH
AFF. w219, w220-22 (2009), http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/documents/publications/HA%20FisherMcClellan%20art.pdf; Mark McClellan et al., A National Strategy To Put Accountable Care Into
Practice, 29 HEALTH AFF. 982, 985-87 (2010), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/5/982.full.html; Stephen M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino,
Health Care Reform Requires Accountable Care Systems, 300 JAMA 95, 96-97 (2008); Stephen M.
Shortell et al., How The Center For Medicare And Medicaid Innovation Should Test Accountable Care
Organizations, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1293, 1294 (2010), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/7/1293.full.html.
6
Policies encouraging integrated delivery of health services through managed care can be traced back to
the work of Dr. Paul Elwood and others in the 1960s, which culminated in the passage of the Health
Maintenance Act in 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 280(c) (1973) (requiring employers offering health insurance to
offer an HMO option). See Robert I. Field, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 80-83 (2007).
2

meet quality performance standards. To do so, ACOs will need to integrate delivery of services
so as to improve the coordination of care reimbursed under Medicare‟s fee-for-service
methodology, invest in infrastructure, and redesign care processes that promote high quality,
efficient service and higher value care.7At bottom, the ACO model attempts to solve what
Devers and Berenson call a “chicken and egg” problem underlying efforts to address health care
costs.8 By one account, the core problem in the health care system lies with payment policies that
reward volume rather than value; hence reform of provider payment should be the first order of
business. Others observe that it is impossible to change the payment system unless delivery
system reform first produces organizations capable of handling an altered payment system. The
MSSP attempts to tackle this policy quandary by addressing both problems simultaneously,
offering financial rewards to providers that organize and reorient their practices to deliver
seamless, high quality care.
Looked at from a market perspective, ACOs can be seen as an attempt to mitigate market
and regulatory failures that pervade the financing and delivery of health care services. Market
imperfections including imperfect agency, information distortions and asymmetry, moral hazard
and monopoly are widely recognized shortcomings that undermine consumer welfare in most
commercial markets for health care products and services.9 The collateral effects of these
conditions can be observed in the remarkably fragmented structure of provider markets. With
physicians practicing primarily in solo practices or small groups10 and group practices often not
coordinating across specialty lines or with inpatient facilities, care delivery is extraordinarily
uncoordinated and episodic.11 Besides causing documented deficiencies in quality, fragmented
markets have also worked to impair effective bargaining and comparative shopping.12 For
example, the absence of vertical integration frustrates the capacity of managed care to negotiate
for cost-effective bundles of services. In hospital markets, most patients delegate choice to their
7

Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,806-961
(Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395) [hereinafter Final Rule].
8
Kelly Devers & Robert Berenson, Can Accountable Care Organizations Improve the Value of Health
Care by Solving the Cost and Quality Quandaries?, URBAN INSTITUTE (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411975_acountable_care_orgs.pdf.
9
Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941,
947 (1963) (“The failure of one or more of the competitive preconditions has as its most immediate and
obvious consequence a reduction in welfare below that obtainable from existing resources and
technology, in the sense of a failure to reach an optimal state in the sense of Pareto.”). See generally
David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets, in 1B
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1093, 1095 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000)
(describing market imperfections in health care); Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and
Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo? 89 OR. L. REV. 810, 817 (2011).
10
Allison Liebhaber & Joy M. Grossman, Physicians Moving to Mid-Sized Single Specialty Practices,
QUALITY & CARE DELIVERY TRACKING REPORT, Aug. 2007, at 1-2, available at
http://www.hschange.com/content/941/941.pdf.
11
See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer R.
Elhauge, ed., 2010) [hereinafter Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care].
12
See Thomas L. Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in Health Care, 71 U.
PITT. L. REV. 217, 229 (2009). See also Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care
Fragmentation and How to Fix It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, 1 (Einer R. Elhauge,
ed., 2010).
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physicians who do not internalize the hospitals‟ costs of technology or excess capacity. In this
context, hospitals benefit more by competing for physician affiliation though various forms of
nonprice competition than by economizing for the benefit of efficient contracting. Regulation
and government payment policies, which strongly influence the practices and norms in the
private sector, also bear significant responsibility for market inefficiencies in health care. Most
notably, the longstanding reliance on fee-for-service methods of payment has spawned an ethos
of provider payment that rewards volume and disincentivizes cost-benefit tradeoffs.13
ACOs under the MSSP Program
While the ACO strategy relies on flexibility in design and structure to accommodate local
market conditions, the core concept envisions a local entity and a related set of providers,
including primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals that can be held accountable for the
cost and quality of the entire continuum of care delivered to a defined population such as
Medicare beneficiaries or subscribers to private insurance plans. 14 Payments to those entities
can take the form of population-based reimbursements such as capitation, fee for service
payments subject to agreed-upon shared savings when the ACOs costs fall below pre-established
benchmarks, or other arrangements. Notably, the MSSP program adopts a “shared savings”
approach under which participating ACOs share in cost reductions achieved compared to
benchmark levels (what Medicare would have paid under fee for service payment for the ACOs
beneficiaries). ACO providers will continue to be paid under Medicare‟s fee-for-service
methodologies but subject to a bonus structure designed to encourage economizing the total costs
for their cohort of beneficiaries. Thus, ACOs constitute an intermediary model for reform that
does not require providers to assume insurance and technical risk for care provided to
beneficiaries but still provides financial incentives to reorient delivery arrangements.15 As such
the bonus-based shared savings model may ultimately prove to be a transitional model, one that
facilitates the transition to a more complete assumption of financial responsibility. For entities
already prepared to accept such obligations, CMS has also established a pilot program for
“Pioneer ACOs” that will employ prepaid population-based reimbursement methods such as
capitation for selected ACOs that can demonstrate sufficient capabilities to manage this kind of
risk.16
Although ACOs may involve a variety of structural configurations among providers, such
as integrated delivery systems, primary care medical groups, hospital-based systems and virtual
13

See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency in Health Care Be Left to the Market?, 26 J. HEALTH POL.
POL‟Y & L. 967, 987 (2001).
14
See Shortell & Casalino, supra note xx at; Elliot S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care:
Moving Forward In Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. W219, W220 (2009), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/2/w219.full.html; MedPAC Report, supra note xx at 39.
15
ROBERT A. BERENSON & RACHEL A. BURTON, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDICARE
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A STATUS UPDATE 8-9 (2011), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412438-Accountable-Care-Organizations-in-Medicare-and-thePrivate-Sector.pdf (stating that the MSSP “puts providers in a position somewhere between being paid
solely through volume-increasing fee-for service payments and operating within tightly managed,
prospectively defined capitated budgets that place providers at full financial risk for all spending for their
enrolled populations.”).
16
See Pioneer ACO Model, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID INNOVATION,
http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/aco/pioneer/ (last visited date).
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networks of physicians such as independent practice associations, designers of the model stress
that all accountable care organizations must have a strong base of primary care.17 That emphasis
is well placed given the underlying defects in the way health care is delivered. Health economists
and policy experts place much of the responsibility for cost and quality deficiencies in health
care on the fragmented nature of the American system (more accurately, “non-system”).18 With
most health professionals working in separate institutional settings with little collaboration,
shared information, or common protocols, clinical decisions lack an effective mechanism to
assess cost or value. Indeed, fragmentation served to undermine managed care‟s incentives to
promote development of efficient delivery organizations. With physicians typically contracting
with multiple payors, incentives to change practice styles or adopt other methods for controlling
cost and improving quality by conforming to the protocols of any single payor are attenuated. As
a result, fee-for-service payment, the predominant method of reimbursement in public and
private insurance, neglects many of the services necessary for cost-effective care delivery. For
example, it fails to pay for care coordination and information exchanges, and undervalues other
valuable services such as cognitive services and communications outside care encounters.19
While ACOs bear a family resemblance to health maintenance organizations in that they
offer a network of providers which will have financial incentives to economize on care, there are
significant differences.20 ACOs are controlled by providers rather than insurers and, unlike
HMOs, beneficiaries are assigned to ACOs and do not actively select their plan. Moreover,
beneficiaries are permitted to utilize physicians outside the ACO to which they have been
assigned. As designed for Medicare beneficiaries under the MSSP, ACOs operate under a
different incentive structure than HMOs. ACOs can choose between two payment models.
Under Track 1 (the “one-sided” payment model) the ACO will share in savings realized without
the risk of sharing in any losses. 21 More experienced ACOs that are ready to share in losses with
greater opportunity for reward may elect the two sided model under Track 2 which provides for
higher sharing rates than would be available under the one-sided model, but require sharing
losses that may occur.22 Finally, the MSSP initiative requires that CMS apply explicit and
detailed quality metrics to ACOs and that it closely monitor their performance.23
The legislative history of the MSSP is limited. Inclusion of the program in the new law
was strongly influenced by the endorsement of the concept in 2009 by MedPAC,24 though the
ultimate model adopted differs in some important respects. For example, MedPAC proposed
mandatory participation of at least one hospital in each ACO while the MSSP contains no such
restriction. Although the Act‟s limited legislative history affords no explanation for this
departure, it probably reflects the drafters‟ perception that hospital participation may undermine
17

Mark McClellan et al., supra note xx at 983 (2010).
See generally Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care, supra note xx; Francis J. Crosson, Medicare: The
Place To Start Delivery System Reform, 28 HEALTH AFF. w232, w232 (2009).
19
See Greaney, supra note xx at 227; Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care
Fragmentation, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note xx .
20
See Berenson & Burton, supra note xx at 2.
21
Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,904.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 67,942.
24
See generally MedPAC Report, supra note xx at 39-58.
18
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ACOs ability to achieve savings by tackling excess hospital expenditures, commonly thought to
be the most promising avenue for cost reductions.25
Two interconnected objectives underlying the design of the MSSP. Perhaps the most
important consideration for the immediate goal reforming Medicare reimbursement is the need
to solve the “chicken and egg” dilemma discussed earlier. Congress recognized that it was
essential to stimulate formation of organizations that could receive and distribute reimbursement
and be responsible for the quality of care under the several new payment arrangements contained
in the ACA and developing in the private sector. Thus innovative programs in the ACA
providing for bundled payment,26 value based purchasing,27 and other arrangements presuppose
the formation of provider organizations that can assume the responsibilities for care coordination
and internal governance and sharing of financial responsibilities.28 The second objective
concerns spillovers from the MSSP in the private sector. Recognizing that ACOs were more
likely to succeed and have transformative effects on the delivery system if they obtained
acceptance by commercial insurers and employers, the architects of the MSSP were eager to
encourage facilitation of private sector initiatives.29
Prospects for Success: Experience and Critiques
The legislative origins of the Medicare Shared Savings Program can be traced to a law
passed in 2000 establishing the Physicians Group Practice Demonstration (PGP) which enabled
nine selected integrated physician groups and one physician hospital organization to keep a
portion of the savings they generated in serving Medicare, beneficiaries with incentives to
increase their share of savings based on a set of 32 quality measures. 30 Notably this experiment
did not provide strong evidence that organizations like ACOs could readily achieve substantial
savings despite the fact that the participants were relatively sophisticated medical groups
experienced in providing integrated care. Although all of the participants were able to improve
the quality of the services they provided, only two participants lowered cost sufficiently to
receive shared savings in all five years of the program, and three received no bonus in any year.31
Despite the disappointing results, these outcomes may not be predictive of the prospects for
ACOs under the MSSP. Incentives to change practice patterns in a short term program would
need to be substantial to encourage substantial savings from providers. Moreover, inasmuch as
25

Andrew A. Kasper, Antitrust Review of Accountable Care Organizations: An Assessment of FTC and
DOJ’s Relaxed Approach to Regulating Physician-Hospital Networks, 90 N.C. L. REV. 203, 214 (2011).
26
ACA § 3023.
27
ACA §§ 3001, 3006, 10301, 10335.
28
See Kasper supra note xx at 214 (“Congress appears to have viewed the ACO program and hospitalphysician bundled payment programs as intimately related, placing the payment-bundling pilot program
immediately after the Shared Savings Program in the bill.”).
29
See e.g., Final Rule, supra note xx at 76 (noting a need to “harmonize” MSSP eligibility rules with
requirements of antitrust law applicable to ACOs operating in the private sector).
30
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-509 (2000).
31
Kathleen K. Sebelius, Report to Congress: Physician Group Practice Demonstration Evaluation
Report, 2009, www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/RTC_Sebelius; Gail Wilensky, Lessons from the
Physician Group Practice Demonstration — A Sobering Reflection, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1659, 1660
(2011), available at www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1110185.
6

fee-for-service payment (both in Medicare and private insurance plans) continued to reward
higher volume, it was probably unrealistic to expect providers to radically change their business
models in a pilot program.32
ACO developers face formidable obstacles in putting the pieces together. For example,
integrating and collectivizing medical practices entails redistributing incomes among
providers—a process certain to entail substantial frictions.33 Because hospital-related wasteful
and unnecessary care constitutes the largest avoidable costs in health care,34 hospitals should be
focus of ACOs‟ cost-cutting strategy. At the same time, hospitals are most likely to have access
to the capital necessary to fund start-up costs for ACOs and historically have been resistant to
sharing control with physicians.35 Moreover, physicians face practical obstacles to reaching
agreement among themselves. There are substantial income disparities among physicians,36 with
primary care physicians earning far less than specialists who in some cases can reap sizeable
profits from the provision of ancillary services. Increased consolidation among specialty
physicians37 confers substantial bargaining power that will make it difficult to reward primary
care practitioners who under many ACO models serve as gatekeepers reducing the amount of
unnecessary procedures and tests. As one respected expert on physician-hospital relations put it,
ACOs will find single specialty groups “as hard to absorb as gravel in the digestive tract.”38
Proponents of the ACO strategy argue forcefully that the experiment is the last best hope
for a market-driven rationalization of the health care system. Jay Crosson, for example, contends
that the ACO concept is “too vitally important to fail,” predicting that the likely alternative if
ACOs do not take root could be indiscriminate, across-the-board cuts to provider payment rates.
39
Optimistic observers suggest that ACOs will improve the dynamics of competition40 and may
32

Berenson & Burton, supra note xx.
Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Partnerships Between Health
Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 35 (2011) (noting problems with income allocation among
physician networks “doomed many provider-organizations in the past”).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 33 (“[F]or many hospital administrators, alignment is a code word for „physicians work for me
and will do what I say.‟”).
36
See Ya-Chen Tina Shih & Thomas R. Konrad, Factors Associated with the Income Distribution of
Full-Time Physicians: A Quantile Regression Approach, 42 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1895, 1906-09 (2007).
37
Hearing on Health Care Industry Consolidation Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Martin Gaynor, Professor, Carnegie Mellon
University) (noting the absence of nationwide data but observing concentration in physician specialty
markets). See also Lawton Burns & Mark V. Pauly, Integrated Delivery Networks: A Detour on the Road
to Integrated Health?, 21 HEALTH AFF. 128 (2002).
38
Goldsmith, supra note xx at 35.
39
F. Jay Crosson, The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever Its Growing Pains, the Concept Is Too
Vitally Important to Fail, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1250, 1254 (2011).
33

40

Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The End of Health Insurance Companies, N.Y TIMES OPINION PAGES
(Jan. 30, 2012, time), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/the-end-of-health-insurance-

companies/ (stating that ACOs offer “a better form of competition” because consumers are better able to
choose physicians than deal with “a bewildering array of copayments, deductibles and annual out of
pocket maximums” in selecting a health plan). See also Shortell et al., supra note xx.
7

ultimately displace private insurance altogether.41 Other prominent health policy experts are less
sanguine about the compatibility of ACOs and a competition-driven marketplace, offering
scenarios in which the failure of competition to restrain cost increases driven by dominant
providers ultimately leads to rate regulation,42 or simply fail to achieve critical mass because of
the intransigence of entrenched providers.43
The ACO Regulation
On March 31, 2011, CMS released its proposed regulation for the MSSP.44 In addition,
and as part of the inter-agency collaborative administrative process, other ACO-related
guidelines were issued: CMS and HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) jointly issued a notice
outlining proposals for waivers of certain Federal laws—the physician self-referral law, the antikickback statute, and certain provisions of the civil monetary penalty law—in connection with
the Shared Savings.45 The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice jointly
issued a “Proposed Statement of Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program” (Antitrust Policy Statement), which
announced safe harbors for less inclusive provider collaborations and a mandatory review
process for larger ones.46 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a notice requesting
comments regarding the need for guidance on participation by tax-exempt organizations in the
Shared Savings Program through ACOs.47 Responding in part to the unfavorable response to the
proposed rule,48 the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) added two additional
programs before the comment period for the rule had closed. It announced the Pioneer ACO
Program49 which is designed for health care organizations and providers that experienced in
coordinating care for patients across care settings, proposes terms that allow such provider
41

Emanuel & Liebman, supra note xx at (predicting that “by 2010, the American health insurance will be
extinct” as ACOs will replace private health insurance companies).
42
See e.g., Hearing on Health Care Industry Consolidation Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Ginsburg Testimony] (statement of Paul B.
Ginsburg, President, Center for Studying Health System Change) (documenting increasing provider
market power and concluding that ineffective market competition may lead to government rate review or
rate setting); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89
OR. L. REV. 847, 874 (2011) (citing rate regulation as possible remedy to hospital market dominance).
43
Goldsmith, supra note xx at 35.
44
Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,528, 19,528
(Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Proposed Rule] (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1395).
45
Waiver Designs in Connection With the Medicare Shared Savings Program and the Innovation Center,
76 Fed. Reg. 19,655, (Apr. 7, 2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
46
Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,894, (Apr. 19, 2011) [hereinafter
Proposed Antitrust Policy Statement].
47
I.R.S. Notice 2011-20, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-20.pdf. [hereinafter IRS
Notice].
48
See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
49
See supra note xx. The program announcement and application form may be found at
http://innovations.cms.gov/areas-of-focus/seamless-and-coordinated-care-models/pioneer-aco.
8

groups to move more rapidly from a shared savings payment model to a population-based
payment model “on a track consistent with, but separate from, the Medicare Shared Savings
Program.”50 In addition, CMS established an Advance Payment Model for ACOs, which were
designed to broaden the opportunity for smaller health care provider groups (specifically those
that do not include inpatient facilities other than critical access hospitals) to participate in the
MSSP by providing upfront payments to be recouped from future shared savings the ACOs
earn.51
The proposed rule generated over 1300 comments many of which were highly critical.
Provider groups were especially concerned with the extensive quality requirements CMS
proposed to review ACO performance (65 separate measures); the imposition of “two sided risk”
in the third year of operation; identification of assigned beneficiaries for whom the ACO would
be held accountable for at the end of the year, after care had been delivered, instead of the
beginning; the requirement that at least 50 percent of an ACO‟s primary care physicians be
meaningful users of electronic health records.52 Although criticisms came from many quarters
including some who argued the regulations were too lax or insufficiently supportive of rural and
safety net interests, provider interest groups were the most vocal and pointed in their comments.
The health industry trade press and policy experts echoed providers‟ critique, concluding that the
burdensome and inapt regulatory structure proposed by CMS would doom the ACO initiative.53
To the surprise of some,54 CMS made some significant changes in its Final Rule in response to
concerns expressed by commenters. In addition, the FTC and Department of Justice, the Office
of Inspector General and the Internal Revenue Service each amended their proposed policies in
significant ways. Together these changes seemed to mollify critics and prompted predictions
that ACO program was “back on track.”55

50

Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, Pioneer ACO Model available at
http://innovations.cms.gov/areas-of-focus/seamless-and-coordinated-care-models/pioneer-aco/.
51
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, Advance Payment Model, available at
http://innovations.cms.gov/areas-of-focus/seamless-and-coordinated-care-models/advance-payment/.
52
See Berenson & Burton supra note xx at 1.
53
Press reports ranged from critical to apoplectic. See e.g., Avik Roy, How Obamacare is Destroying
Accountable Care Organizations, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/08/19/how-obamacare-is-destroying-accountable-careorganizations/.
54
See Phil Galewitz & Jenny Gold, HHS Releases Final Regulations For ACOs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/october/20/accountable-care-organizationrules-regulations.aspx.
55
N.C. Aizenman, Obama Administration Revises Medicare Rules For Coordinated Care, WASH. POST
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-administration-revisesmedicare-rules-for-coordinated-care/2011/10/20/gIQAsT7W1L_story.html (stating new rule “greeted
with jubilation by groups representing doctors and hospitals”); Noam M. Levy, Changes seek to save key
aspect of healthcare law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/20/nation/lana-medicare-partnerships-20111021.
9

The Final Rule modifies the Proposed Rule in a number of important respects. While by
no means exhaustive, the following changes are particularly germane to the market issues
discussed in this paper.
Reduced quality and structural requirements. The Final Rule reduced requirements for
“meaningful use” of electronic health records, lowered the number of performance measures for
bonus eligibility was reduced from 65 to 33 and eased other quality reporting requirements. 56 In
addition, ACOs will now be allowed to add or subtract providers within the performance period.
Antitrust Review. The Final Rule withdraws a requirement that ACOs with dominant
provider participants obtain prior antitrust clearance from the FTC or Department of Justice as a
condition of approval for participation in the MSSP.57
Beneficiary assignment. Rather than assign beneficiaries retrospectively to ACOs, the
Final Rule adopts a “step-wise” approach that will provide ACOs will a timely list with quarterly
updates of the beneficiaries that are likely to be attributed, enabling ACOs to reach out to
beneficiaries, while reconciling the list at the end of the year so that the ACO is not held
responsible for those beneficiaries who shifted their care to other providers during the year. 58
Governance. The Final Rule relaxed requirements that participants (providers and
suppliers) have proportionate control over the organizations. The IRS has indicated that it will
relieve tax exempt ACOs from the requirement that exempt participants such as hospitals have
“control” over the ACO.59 While preserving a requirement that 75 percent of ACO‟s governing
body be chosen by ACO participants (providers and suppliers), the Final Rule allows for
alternative structures that “involve ACO participants in innovative ways in ACO governance.”
Financial rewards. The Final Rule revised the formula for distributing savings so that
ACOs achieving savings will receive a share of the first dollar of savings rather than have to first
exceed a benchmark.
Waivers of Fraud and Abuse Laws. Pursuant to statutory authority contained in the ACA,
HHS set out a number of waivers from the Physician Self-Referral Law, the federal antikickback statute, and the gainsharing Civil Monetary Penalty law.60 These waivers will allow
providers to share startup costs, distribute shared savings, and provide certain incentives to
beneficiaries without running afoul of those laws.
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Shared savings without sharing risk. Backing away from a proposed requirement that all
ACOs bear risk by year three, the Final rule allows ACOs to choose a three-year, shared-savingsonly version.61
These changes illustrate myriad, and sometimes conflicting, policies embedded in the
ACO experiment. For example, a central objective of the MSSP is to stimulate investment in
ACOs. However this entails nuanced regulation that simultaneously encourages ACO formation
by as-yet unintegrated providers while also rewarding entities already operating as integrated
delivery systems. In addition, ACOs hold the promise of restraining cost growth in the Medicare
program but at the same time encouraging investments in evidence-based medicine, “patientcentered” delivery, electronic health records and other service innovations. Further, a key
determinant of the MSSP‟s success will be its coordination and influence in commercial
insurance and delivery markets. As will be discussed in the following sections of this article, this
goal calls for flexibility in regulatory matters and careful attention to avoid legal standards that
invite cost shifting or other harmful spillovers in those markets.
II.

Regulating Medicare to Improve Private Markets

Since its inception, traditional Medicare has reimbursed providers using methodologies
that reward volume. Medicare Part B pays physicians on a fee-for-service basis, i.e. issuing a
separate payment for each service provided to Medicare beneficiaries.62 Hospitals, reimbursed
under Part A, receive prospective reimbursements for all services provided to beneficiaries under
specific diagnoses. Although this methodology is commendable for bundling hospital services
and thus mitigating volume-enhancing incentives to some extent, it not free of cost-escalating
incentives. For example, historically hospitals have been overpaid for readmitted patients and,
under some circumstances, for patients with multiple diagnoses.63 Moreover, physician and
hospital incentives are misaligned. As a result of fee-for-service payment physicians have strong
incentives to increase the volume of services provided in hospitals, while prospective payment
rewards hospitals for economizing on care. With independent physicians calling the shots on
care in most hospitals, their power to admit, prescribe tests and services, and extend the stays of
patients in hospitals have caused hospital costs to escalate enormously despite prospective
payment reforms. Hospitals have responded by increasing admissions and have benefited by
generous reimbursement for diagnoses served by new technologies.64 Further, while Congress
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has repeatedly attempted to control Medicare costs through per service rate controls, expansion
in the amount of services per patient have more than offset price regulation.
As described above, the MSSP seeks to encourage formation of integrated delivery
systems capable of receiving value based payments. Although the ACA gave the Secretary of
HHS discretion to employ capitated payment models for ACOs,65 she chose not do so. Instead,
the MSSP continues fee for service payment and provides bonuses to ACOs if their patients‟
total health care costs are below a projected amount based on the historic spending of providers
in that ACO. The program‟s financial incentives are skewed to minimizing the transitional
uncertainties in other ways as well. For example it rewards cost savings regardless of whether
the benchmark of the particular ACO is relatively high or low and ACOs may seek a “bonus
only” model and avoid risking financial losses in its initial three year contract.
Despite the market-improving potential of ACO delivery systems, the private market has
not led the way. While a number of commercial insurance companies have initiated programs to
reward ACO delivery models most of them rely on a shared savings model rather than requiring
ACOs to share financial risk.66 Historically, Medicare payment policies strongly influence
private payment with private payors generally adopting the methods and details of government
payment. They do so as a result of collective action problems—the difficulties inherent in
securing providers‟ acceptance of innovative payment methodologies often requiring new
practice methods for only a fraction of their patient base.
The architects of health reform were especially attuned to the goal of encouraging
widespread adoption of the ACOs and therefore strove to design the MSSP to encourage ACOs
serving Medicare beneficiaries to contract with private payers as well.67 This required CMS to
strike a delicate balance between serving Medicare‟s programmatic goals while also innovative
and competitive ACO formation in the private sector. As discussed below the private and public
payment sector share common interests in promoting development of efficient delivery systems
and preventing harms to patients. At the same time the regulatory mission of CMS is centered on
advancing the goals of the Medicare program and not on supervising the market served by
private insurance.
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In many respects the goals of the Medicare program and private insurance payers are
congruent. Encouraging providers to develop more efficient delivery organizations has the
potential to improve quality and outcomes. Studies show that integrated delivery systems and
multi-specialty provide more preventive services68 and have on average better quality
indicators.69 In addition, integrated systems are a pre-requisite for channeling and distributing
payments to providers so as to permit effective rationalization of care. Providers accepting
responsibility for care delivery for a defined population will of necessity need to coordinate
delivery and agree on protocols for practice, distribution of income and a variety of other issues.
Numerous other reforms contained in the ACA such as bundled payment pilot programs70 also
depend on providers adopting integrative delivery models.
This congruence notwithstanding, given CMS‟s regulatory mission and the fiscal and
political climate in which it operates today, it is at least questionable whether the MSSP will
adequately serve the interests of the private market. Most significant is the fact that Medicare
relies primarily administrative pricing and command regulation to control costs. That is, CMS is
unlikely to focus on promoting provider competition—the driving force for cost control in
private insurance markets—because, to put it bluntly, Medicare can dictate its prices to doctors
and hospitals.71 Operating in a political environment in which government expenditures are
under intense scrutiny, the impulse to shift costs to the private sector is likely to be significant.
Moreover, concerns about the excesses of managed care that surfaced in the 1990s have not
disappeared,72 and government regulators may be overly zealous in promulgating regulations
designed to protect consumers. For example, it appears that CMS overlearned the lessons of the
managed care backlash in fashioning excessively restrictive regulations for ACOs in its Proposed
68
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Rule,73 although it subsequently responded to strenuous criticisms by reducing the quality
measures for which organizations will be accountable in its Final Rule.74
A central problem confronting governmental efforts to regulate ACOs with an eye to
protecting competition in private markets is the issue of cost shifting. Some question whether
Medicare payment policies have in the past caused providers to shift costs to private payers.
Economic theory challenges the simplest cost-shifting formulation-- that providers raise their
prices to private payers to recoup whatever they may lose because Medicare pays less—because
monopoly providers are likely to be charging private payers a profit-maximizing price already.
However, cost shifting is entirely possible where providers have unused bargaining leverage.
Given that over seventy percent of acute care hospitals are nonprofit, thus arguably operating
under somewhat different incentives than for-profit entities, and that political and social factors
may affect hospital board‟s willingness to maximize profits, the existence of unused bargaining
power is plausible.
While a number of empirical studies suggest that cost shifting does sometimes occur,75 a
more nuanced account has emerged from an examination of the relationship between market
competition and hospital costs. This analysis relies on the well-documented tendency of hospitals
in concentrated local markets to exercise their bargaining leverage to raise prices they charge to
private insurers. Although they may extract these profits regardless of whether Medicare
payments are adequate or inadequate to cover the treatment costs for Medicare beneficiaries,
empirical analysis indicates that hospitals use these revenues to engage in the so-called “medical
arms race” (expansions in capacity, acquisition of new clinical technologies, enhancement of
staff budgets). 76As the 2009 MedPAC annual report explains, this hydraulic explains the fact
that dominant hospitals have higher costs per patient, and therefore lower Medicare margins
73
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because Medicare pays fixed prices that are insensitive to market power of hospitals.77
(Conversely, hospitals in competitive markets realize higher Medicare margins owing to lower
cost structures caused by rivalry in their markets).
The effects of concentration and the cost shifting hydraulic are felt by the Medicare
program as well as by the private market. As a general matter, market dominance protected by
significant barriers to entry tends to result in less innovation. In health care markets this suggests
that the spur to undertake cost savings through the arduous process of changing long standing
medical practices will be attenuated. Second, there is some evidence that market concentration
produces lower quality, as measured by indices of mortality and outcomes.78 Such effects
obviously redound to harm Medicare beneficiaries and private pay patients alike. Third,
disparities in profit margins, if sufficient may reduce participation by providers, thereby
undermining access for beneficiaries. Likewise, low margins for services specific to the
Medicare population will result in less investment by providers in those services.
This section has demonstrated the close interconnection between private and public
markets. Two salient policy prescriptions follow from this analysis. In regulating ACOs CMS
should abandon its historic agnosticism with regard to cost shifting. Beyond carefully evaluating
data gathered under the MSSP, it should insist that, as a condition of renewal after the expiration
of their three year contracts, ACOs document pricing patterns in the private sector to determine
whether significant cost-shifting has occurred and whether purported cost savings in the program
were realized. The second implication for policy analysis, discussed in the next section, is that
significant interagency cooperation between CMS and the antitrust agencies is needed to curb the
anticompetitive effects that providers with dominant market power may wreak on both private
markets and the Medicare program.
III.

Antitrust, Competition Policy and ACOs

Concerns about the competiveness of provider markets have shadowed the MSSP
implementation process. Policy experts, trade associations and academics have questioned
whether local hospital and physician markets will be conducive to achieving the program‟s
goals.79 Three distinct issues must be considered. First, one must question whether ACOs can
accomplish the MSSP‟s ambitious “triple aim” in the absence of vigorously competitive provider
markets that will permit intra-network rivalry to flourish. Second, concerns have been raised as
to whether the MSSP itself will stimulate additional concentration of provider markets and
whether antitrust enforcement will be able to curb anticompetitive mergers and joint ventures.
Finally, regulators will need to strike a balance between supervising quality and competitive
conditions on the one hand, and encouraging entry by multiple networks in each market on the
other.
Provider Concentration and Bargaining Leverage
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Provider market power poses the biggest obstacle to the success of the ACO strategy. As
a general matter, it is clear that over the last fifteen years providers have generally gained the
upper hand in bargaining with payers. 80 A large body of literature documents the existence,
scope, and effects of market concentration. Meta-analysis by Vogt and Town demonstrates a
strong correlation between hospital market concentration and escalating costs of health
insurance: hospital consolidation in the 1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at least 5%, and
by 40% or more when merging hospitals were located close to one another.81 An important study
undertaken by the Massachusetts Attorney General documents the effects of provider leverage on
health care costs and insurance premiums,82 notably finding prices for health services are
uncorrelated with quality, complexity, proportion of government patients, or academic status but
instead are positively correlated with provider market power.83 Another report, drawing on site
visits by the Center for Studying Health System Change to six California markets in 2008, found
that provider leverage has had a “major impact on California premium trends.”84 Interviews in
these markets revealed that the bargaining power of hospitals has been enhanced by extensive
horizontal consolidation. In many markets around the country, hospitals have been able to
establish themselves as “must have” hospitals --meaning health plans must include them in their
networks to offer insurance products attractive to employers and consumers—by means of
advertising, locational advantages, or other means that establish a “reputation for perceived
quality—not to be confused with measured clinical quality.” Finally, anecdotal evidence
suggests that large multispecialty group practices and independent practice associations also
exercise market power by virtue of a lack of price competition for their services.85
Other, subtler results have also flowed from the wave of consolidations and the
marginalization of managed care. An important effect of increasing consolidation in hospital
markets, generally ignored by antitrust analysis, is the effect of “cross-market” mergers, i.e.
those occurring between hospitals in distinct geographic markets. Recent economic analysis has
demonstrated that anticompetitive effects can occur where large hospital systems enhance their
bargaining leverage vis a vis payers by threatening to create gaps or “holes” in payers‟ coverage
in a geographic region.86 Second, besides price increases owing to enhanced bargaining power,
growth in hospital costs appear to have been driven by strategic decisions that take advantage of
market imperfections and the absence of effective monitoring by payers. By some accounts, the
80
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“medical arms race” has resurfaced. 87 That is, hospitals have undertaken significant expansions
in high-margin services and have accelerated technology acquisitions, a phenomenon attributable
in part to providers‟ capacity to induce demand. In addition, specialty physicians have proved
unwilling to join multi-specialty practices, preferring to consolidate into single specialty
practices.88 The latter organizational form, which allows specialty physicians to reap the
financial benefits of their bargaining leverage, also denies patients the clinical and cost-saving
advantages associated with integrated practice arrangements.
The foregoing analysis, exposing the problem of extant provider market power, spells
trouble for the ACO strategy. Hospitals and dominant physician specialty groups have been
able to command substantial increases in reimbursement from private health insurers and
effectively insulate themselves from pressures to accept change in payment or practice
arrangements. Providers enjoying market power or “must have” status will be reluctant to cede
control or equitably share revenues with other providers or substantially alter the way they
practice medicine. While dominant providers may feel compelled to form ACOs out of concern
that CMS may ultimately condition Medicare payments to strongly favor such organizations,
they are likely to seek arrangements that entrench and perhaps expand their market power vis a
vis private insurers. A closely related concern is that monolithic ACOs dominant in multiple
provider services will thwart the objective of ensuring multiple ACOs or other rivalrous
networks in each market so as to promote continuing incentives to improve quality and lower
costs over time.89 These concerns led HHS to enlist the support of the federal antitrust
enforcement agencies to monitor the effects of additional provider consolidation stimulated by
the MSSP.
The FTC/ Department of Justice Statement of Enforcement Policy
In conjunction with the issuance by CMS of the final MSSP regulations, the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission issued a final joint "Statement of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program."90 The FTC/DOJ Statement, which made some significant changes from an earlier
Proposed Statement, outlines the general enforcement policies the agencies will apply in
analyzing the effect of CMS-approved ACOs on private insurance markets. Importantly, the
antitrust agencies recognized the need to steer a delicate course between encouraging market
entry and deterring agreements that impeded competition. Accordingly, the Final Statement
attempts to strike a balance between (1) clarifying antitrust standards and review procedures
applicable to participants in the private insurance market so as not to deter procompetitive
cooperation and consolidation among providers and (2) exercising effective oversight of
consolidations spurred by the MSSP that may damage competition in private markets.
The Final Statement is noteworthy for several policies designed to encourage ACO
development and remove some uncertainties surrounding the application of antitrust law. First, it
87
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announces that CMS's eligibility criteria -- including a management structure that comprises
clinical and administrative processes and processes to promote evidence-based medicine and
patient engagement -- are broadly consistent with the agencies' prior statements regarding
clinical integration.91 Through an extensive series of advisory opinions,92 policy statements93 and
speeches,94 the FTC has articulated detailed criteria to identify physician networks that have
undertaken sufficient coordination of clinical and organizational arrangements so as to make the
physicians‟ efforts truly interdependent and hence not subject to summary condemnation as price
fixing arrangements. The Final Statement also indicated that joint negotiations with private
payers will be deemed reasonably necessary to an ACO's purpose of improving health care, and
ACOs utilizing the same structure and processes used in the shared savings program to serve
privately insured patients will accordingly be afforded rule of reason treatment. 95 Together these
statements effectively remove the possibility that an ACO certified by CMS will be regarded as
price fixing and subject to strict, per se scrutiny. Finally the agencies also set parameters for
market power and incorporate a new metric for assessing market power in ACO networks. The
Final statement announces a "safety zone" for ACOs whose independent participants provide a
"common service" and have a combined share of 30 percent or less of each such common service
in each participant's primary service area.96 ACOs falling within the safety zone will be
presumed to be “highly unlikely to raise significant competitive concerns.”97
These pronouncements constitute a modest relaxation of antitrust standards previously
announced by the agencies. The standard for clinical integration applied by the FTC advisory
opinions involves an examination of various indicia testing the degree of interdependence and
cooperation among physician participants.98 As a general matter, the agency has sought to avoid
91
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being overly prescriptive in its approach to clinical integration. Instead, its letters provided
lengthy analyses of the features of each proposal, pointing to factors that tended to create a “high
degree of interdependence and cooperation among physicians to control cost and ensure
quality.”99 The letters also address a second question critical to ancillary restraint analysis: Is
collective price negotiation reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of the clinically
integrated network? In the letters providing a favorable response, the FTC has relied upon
evidence that an agreement on price promoted physician cooperation with standards and ensured
network stability.100 It should be noted however that although the FTC has been broadly
supportive of efforts to form networks relying on clinical integration, some within the agency
hold the view that financial integration offers a more reliable incentive to produce efficiencies
necessary to justify enhanced opportunities to exercise market power.101
In a notable concession aimed at reducing uncertainty and encouraging ACO development,
the antitrust agencies have elected to defer to CMS on the issue of clinical integration. The Final
Statement provides that “organizations meeting the CMS criteria for approval as an ACO are
reasonably likely to be bona fide arrangements intended to improve the quality, and reduce the
costs, of providing medical and other health care services through their participants' joint
efforts.”102 The standards that will be applied by CMS to determine eligibility to participate in
the MSSP are less specific, but broadly congruent with the standards identified by the FTC
advisory opinions.103 Although some commenters have criticized the agencies for ceding their
responsibility for monitoring competition in private markets to CMS,104 in this instance,
deference appears entirely appropriate. The Final Statement‟s approach to clinical integration is
an acknowledgement of the uncertainty inherent in a multi-factor, case-by-case evaluation of the
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clinical integration and a pragmatic effort to cooperate with CMS to encourage entry into the
ACO market. At the same time, the agencies‟ deference to CMS regulatory standards marks a
striking departure from their customary practice of evaluating competitive issues based on the
specific conditions obtaining in individual circumstances and a general aversion to
administrative regulation of markets.
Other aspects of the Final Statement are more controversial. For ACOs that meet CMS
eligibility criteria, the antitrust agencies have established several important changes in their
procedures and standards for review of possible antitrust problems. Notably these provisions are
designed to give some reassurance to entities forming ACOs that their formation and operation
will not be subject to federal antitrust challenge based on the ACOs‟ effects in the private
market. Approval, however, will not be a precondition for participation in the MSSP. As we will
see, this change constitutes an important misstep that may severely undermine effective policing
of dominant providers.
To further advance the goals of reducing uncertainty and encouraging ACO formation, the
Final Statement establishes a “safety zone” for ACOs that combine independent providers by
means other than merger. ACOs meeting the antitrust agencies‟ standards are “highly unlikely to
raise significant competitive concerns.” To qualify, ACOs must satisfy the following two
requirements to fall within the Safety Zone: (1) “independent ACO participants … that provide
the same services … must have a combined share of 30 percent or less of each common service
in each participant's PSA, wherever two or more ACO participants provide that service to
patients from that PSA”; and (2) “Any hospital or ambulatory surgery center … participating in
an ACO must be non-exclusive to the ACO … regardless of its PSA share.” 105 The PSA referred
to above is a measure—and one not recognized in antitrust precedents—that will serve as a
proxy for calculating combined market share of independent ACO participants. The antitrust
agencies here opted for pragmatism over economic accuracy: the PSA standard as a to enable
ACOs to calculate market power for safety zone eligibility using a convenient, administrable
standard.106 The quantitative aspects of the standard are roughly equivalent to standards
contained in the antitrust agencies‟ Health Policy Statements though in some respects it is more
lenient.107 Moreover, ACOs comprised of dominant providers are subject to some restrictions,108
but are not precluded from qualifying for safety zone treatment. Significantly, enforcement for
hospital dominated ACO would not be materially different than the environment facing
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physician-only ACOs; arguably this lowers the standard applied under the agencies Policy
Statements which subjected multi-provider networks to more rigorous scrutiny than physicianonly networks.109
An overall appraisal of the Final Statement reveals, at most, a modest relaxation of antitrust
standards for ACOs. Some aspects of prior safety zones are lessened: ACOs lacking financial
integration may qualify as presumptively legal under the safety zone whereas a full rule of
reason analysis was required under the Policy Statement. Further, ACO with exclusive networks
combining providers up to 30 market share (rather than 20 percent), ACOs with a single provider
with more than 50 percent of the services in one area, and multi-provider networks that include
hospitals all may enjoy safety zone treatment.110 However these changes are not major
departures from the earlier guidelines promulgated by the agencies, and may, in fact, be more
stringent than the enforcement policies actually practiced by the FTC and Department of
Justice.111 Of greater concern, as discussed in the next section of this article, are the measures not
undertaken to expand and improve antitrust oversight of provider consolidation resulting from
the formation of ACOs.
Antitrust Law’s Achilles Heel: Dealing with Extant Market Power
A common misapprehension among legislators and policymakers is that antitrust law
provides a reliable counterforce to monopoly. With respect to extant monopolies, legally
acquired, the opposite is true: antitrust law tolerates the exercise of market power (which
includes charging higher prices, reducing output, and/or lowering quality) and generally
intervenes only where monopolists wrongfully exercise that power to exclude or harm rivals.112
Dominant hospital systems and provider groups face little danger that they will be broken into
smaller units. Moreover they are free to insist on monopoly levels of reimbursement and the
extensive literature on hospital-payor bargaining confirms that dominant providers commonly
exercise their positional leverage vis a vis private payers.113
Nothing in the CMS Final Rule, the antitrust agencies‟ Final Statement, or federal antitrust
enforcement policies suggests that the regulation of ACOs will lessen extant provider
concentration. For example, despite the recent wave of physician acquisitions by hospitals and
mergers of competing providers, the agencies did not take steps to incorporate retrospective
reviews of mergers into their evaluation of ACO applicants under the MSSP.114 Indeed, ACOs
with dominant providers will qualify for safety zone treatment if they are nonexclusive.115
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Hence it is clear that many ACOs will be comprised of providers with market power. To the
extent that ACOs combine providers with some degree of market power, the MSSP may actually
enhance the bargaining power of those providers and also enable the ACO to leverage that
power to benefit other provider segments that did not have bargaining power prior to joining the
ACO.
Despite its incapacity to de-concentrate markets, antitrust law does impose some restrictions
on the exercise of market power by dominant firms. Firms that use their dominant position to
exclude rivals, raise their costs, or otherwise hinder the competitive process may be subject to
treble damages or injunctions under the Sherman Act. Several recent cases illustrate the ability
of dominant providers to insist on exclusionary contracts (sometimes with dominant insurers)
that impair the ability of rival hospitals to compete. For example in United States v. United
Regional Health Care System,116 a case recently settled by a consent decree, the Department of
Justice alleged that the defendant, a dominant, “must-have” hospital117 entered into contracts
with commercial health insurance companies, requiring the insurance companies had to pay a
“substantial pricing penalty,” ranging from 13% to 27%, if the insurers also contracted with
competing providers. Though rationalized by defendants as “discount” pricing, the government
claimed they were of such magnitude as to make it commercially unreasonable for an insurance
company to enter into a contract with competing hospitals, unless the competing hospital would
agree to prices below United Regional's marginal cost. The government claimed that by
foreclosing rivals from the most profitable health insurance contracts, defendant was able to
entrench its market dominance.118
In another case involving allegations of exclusionary contracting by a dominant hospital,
West Penn Allegheny Health System,119 the second-largest hospital system in Pittsburgh, alleged
that the dominant hospital system in the market, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center,
conspired with Highmark Inc., the market‟s dominant insurer in a scheme designed to protect
both defendants from competition in their respective markets. West Penn Allegheny claimed
that UPMC had agreed to refuse to enter into competitive provider contracts with Highmark‟s
rivals and take other steps advantageous to Highmark in return for Highmark‟s agreement to pay
to UPMC “supracompetitive reimbursement rates” made possible by increasing its insurance
premiums.120 The Third Circuit found the alleged conduct, amounting to a conspiracy between UPMC
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and Highmark to drive out West Penn out of the market, sufficiently anticompetitive to survive a motion
to dismiss.121

Finally, Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth122 illustrates the exercise of pricing power
by a dominant hospital. This case arose in a two hospital market: Cascade offered primary and
secondary care services while PeaceHealth offered primary, secondary, and tertiary care services.
The alleged anticompetitive conduct focused on PeaceHealth pricing strategy involved discounts
on tertiary services to insurance companies that made PeaceHealth their exclusive provider for
primary, secondary, and tertiary services. In addition, PeaceHealth also offered less favorable
prices generally to insurance companies that contracted with Cascade as a preferred provider for
primary or secondary care services. Plaintiff alleged defendant‟s “bundled” pricing operated to
exclude it from the market in violation of the Sherman Act. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit adopted
a test that struck a middle ground between competing standards found in precedents, scholarship
and a commission chartered to study antitrust doctrine.123 However much remains unresolved as
to the appropriate measure of improper bundled pricing or the test to determine the likelihood of
harm to consumers.124
These and other cases125 involving the interplay hospital and payor dominance yield several
important lessons. Hospitals with market power may seek to entrench or extend their dominant
position by a variety of contracting or pricing schemes. In some instances, dominant payers and
dominant hospitals have reached understandings pursuant to which each will refrain from hard
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bargaining with the other126 or will deal on unfavorable terms with the other‟s rivals.127 While
antitrust litigation can challenge these tactics, such cases are fact-intensive, require extensive
analysis, and in areas in which the law remains unsettled. For example, plaintiffs alleging
anticompetitive bundling or tying face notoriously high evidentiary burdens and there is
considerable dispute over the legal standard that is applicable.128 As a result, antitrust law is
more paper tiger than bulwark against abuse when dealing with incumbent monopolies. The
following section analyzes other avenues of redress against conduct by dominant providers in the
context of regulating ACOs.
Addressing Anticompetitive Conduct in ACOs: The Four “No-Nos,” Mandatory Agency Review,
and its Demise
In drafting their Policy Statements and coordinating with CMS, the antitrust agencies were
acutely aware of risk that extant market power would undermine the procompetitive benefits of
the ACO strategy. However, a significant change from the framework set forth in CMS‟s
Proposed Rule and the antitrust agencies‟ Proposed Statement severely undermined prospects for
achieving some measure of control over potential anticompetitive conduct. Both the Proposed
Statement and the Final Statement identify specific categories of conduct, which the Statements
counsel may, under certain circumstances, raise competitive concerns and should be avoided.
The most obvious warning is directed at garden-variety horizontal collusion. The Final Statement
counsels that ACO participants should avoid improper exchanges of price or other competitively
sensitive information among competing participants, which may facilitate collusion in the
provision of services outside the ACO.129 The remaining four categories entail vertical
arrangements that have the potential to foreclose competition by rival networks or raise entry
barriers. These warnings,130 directed to ACOs with high PSA shares (or other indicia of market
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power), are designed to deter the exercise of market power that “may prevent private payers from
obtaining lower prices and better quality services for their enrollees.”131
1. Discouraging private payers from directing or incentivizing patients to choose certain
providers thorough contractual terms such as “anti-steering,” “anti-tiering,” “guaranteed
inclusion,” and “most favored nations” provisions.
2. Tying sales of the ACO's services to the private payer's purchase of other services from
providers outside the ACO, and vice versa.
3. Contracting with ACO participants on an exclusive basis.
4. Restricting a private payer's ability to make available cost, quality, efficiency and
performance information to aid enrollees in evaluating and selecting providers in the
health plan if it is similar to that used in the shared savings program.
A very significant aspect of the antitrust agencies‟ Proposed Statement was the screening
process that CMS and the agencies decided not to pursue. Backing away from the approach set
forth in their Proposed Statement, the agencies and CMS eliminated a requirement for mandatory
antitrust review as prerequisite to certification for participation in the MSSP. Mandatory review
had initially been contemplated for all ACOs whose share for any common service that two or
more independent ACO participants provided to patients in the same primary service area
exceeded 50 percent. 132 Thus it subjected those ACOs comprised of dominant providers to close
antitrust scrutiny both as to their structural characteristics and conduct in the commercial market.
The preapproval requirement held the promise of accomplishing two objectives. First, it could
serve to discourage formation of ACOs aiming to press the structural boundaries set forth in the
Statements. Further, as discussed below, the mandatory review process gave the antitrust
agencies additional bargaining leverage in dealing with anticompetitive conduct of the kind
described in the agencies‟ four antitrust warnings.
CMS also justified mandatory review as serving the interests of the MSSP program for
Medicare beneficiaries, arguing it provided assurance that participating ACOs would not be later
found to present competitive problems that could subject them to antitrust challenge that could
prevent them from completing the term of their agreement.133 In addition, the agency legitimated
mandatory review by drawing an explicit link between vigorous private market competition and
the interests of the Medicare Program:
[Mandatory antitrust review] would maintain competition for the benefit of
Medicare beneficiaries by reducing the potential for the creation of ACOs with
market power. In this context market power refers to the ability of an ACO to
reduce the quality of care furnished to Medicare beneficiaries and/or to raise
prices or reduce the quality for commercial health plans and enrollees, thereby
potentially increasing providers‟ incentives to provide care for private enrollees of
higher-paying health plans rather than for Medicare beneficiaries.
…[C]ompetition in the marketplace benefits Medicare and the Shared Savings
Program because it promotes quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries and
131
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protects beneficiary access to care. Furthermore, competition benefits the Shared
Savings Program by allowing the opportunity for the formation of two or more
ACOs in an area. Competition among ACOs can accelerate advancements in
quality and efficiency. All of these benefits to Medicare patients would be
reduced or eliminated if we were to allow ACOs to participate in the Shared
Savings Program when their formation and participation would create market
power.134
In its Final Rule however, CMS and the agencies withdrew the mandatory review
requirement. Without fully crediting any particular objection, CMS noted a number of criticisms
it had received. Some commenters claimed mandatory review conferred unreviewable authority
on the antitrust agencies to disqualify entities from participating in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program which is subject to the regulatory oversight of HHS alone. According to this line of
argument the transfer of oversight violated a rarely-invoked administrative law principle, the
subdelegation doctrine.135 Others objected that the process converted antitrust review into a
regulatory process, imposed entry-inhibiting costs on ACOs, and unduly focused regulators‟
attention on market structure rather than conduct.136 On the other hand, some comments,
primarily from third party payors, argued that the mandatory review policy should be
strengthened, such as by setting the PSA market level requiring review at 40% or favoring ACOs
without market power until the agency had enough experience to calibrate and refine the
program.137
Without acknowledging the merits of the subdelegation arguments or other concerns,
CMS chose to abandon mandatory review, stating that it believed it could accomplish its
announced objectives through a three-pronged, “less burdensome approach.”138 First, the
antitrust agencies will make available an expedited voluntary program for reviewing antitrust
problems raised by any ACO applicant. Second, CMS promised to provide the Antitrust
Agencies aggregate claims data which will assist the Antitrust Agencies in calculating PSA
shares for ACOs participating in the Shared Savings Program and will require newly formed
ACOs to agree, as part of their application to participate in the MSSP to share their MSSP
application with the Antitrust Agencies.139 Third, the antitrust agencies would “rely on existing
enforcement processes for evaluating concerns…and filing antitrust complaints when
appropriate.”140 Perhaps acknowledging it had served some pretty weak tea, CMS opened the
door for coordinating with the antitrust agencies scrutiny of competition issues in the future. The
Final Rule states that CMS has requested that the Antitrust Agencies “conduct a study examining
how ACOs participating in the Shared Savings Program have affected the quality and price of
134
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health care in private markets,” anticipating possible use of the study “to evaluate whether we
should, in the future, expand our eligibility criteria so that we consider competition concerns
more explicitly in the Shared Savings Program application review process.”141
Roads Not Taken
As discussed in the foregoing sections, the Final Rule did little to protect private markets
from potentially harmful spillovers resulting from the development of ACOs under the MSSP.
We have seen that antitrust enforcement provides no relief from the lawful exercise of extant
market power. Further, claims of foreclosure of competition by tying, bundling, and
exclusionary contracting involve some unsettled issues of law and require extensive factual
investigation. It was therefore unrealistic to expect antitrust enforcement to provide a timely or
dependable bulwark against the exercise of market power as ACO‟s form and establish
themselves in local markets. Given the serious prospects of cost shifting and spillovers in private
insurance markets, a prophylactic, regulatory approach would have been desirable. This section
discusses some of the missed opportunities and remaining options for competition-improving
regulation.
The most direct path would have been to impose ex ante requirements aimed at
preventing anticompetitive behaviors. This appraisal could have occurred at the screening stage
of MSSP applicants and applied where the review revealed marginally excessive concentration
or problematic agreements among participants in an ACO. However, foregoing mandatory
review severely undermined the antitrust agencies‟ leverage to insist on preconditions. Lacking
the gatekeeping power that follows from requiring agency clearance, the FTC and Department of
Justice were denied the opportunity to negotiate binding conditions of participation as is
commonly done in consent decrees in merger cases.142 For example, CMS might have imposed
various regulatory conditions for MSSP participation such as heightened transparency or prenotification in close cases that could have reduced risks of anticompetitive conduct or better
positioned the antitrust agencies to undertake timely enforcement actions.
A further problem with the approach to provider dominance in the Final Rule and Final
Statement is that the antitrust agencies‟ MSSP scrutiny focuses only collaborations of otherwise
independent providers. Other than requiring nonexclusive contracting in some circumstances and
the four warnings on conduct, the rule does not require any special review of ACOs formed by
dominant providers or where dominance is the result of mergers rather than collaborative
contracting. As one commenter pointed out, this places asymmetric administrative burdens on
smaller ACOs seeking to enter into acceptable collaborative arrangements, and may perversely
141
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encourage the independent providers to consolidate into a larger single entity (or in the case of
physicians, to seek employment with hospitals).143 Indeed a policy that more closely scrutinizes
mergers and favoring collaborations by smaller providers rather than mergers or employment
relationships would have the pro-competitive virtue of leaving open the possibility that
individual providers might at some point withdraw and form new networks or rivalrous ACOs.
Intermediate regulatory options were also available. Commenters on Proposed Rule
suggested a number of steps that CMS might take to reduce the risks of anticompetitive harm
from dominant provider ACOs. For example, several suggested ways to improve detection and
analysis of competitive conditions such as collaborative data collection by CMS and the antitrust
agencies, mandating public reporting on the cost and price of care, and close monitoring of
provider pricing in commercial markets. 144 Another means of promoting competitive bargaining
would be to require monopoly hospitals, on request of buyers, to unbundle their competitive
services in negotiations with employers or payers. As suggested in a path-breaking article by
Professors Havighurst and Richman, requiring hospitals to separate offerings of monopolized
services from the “cluster market” of competitively-supplied acute care services would preserve
a competitive market for services that are not monopolized and would make more transparent the
pricing in services dominated by a single provider.145 Payers could then bargain down the prices
of those services having good substitutes and might be able to encourage pricing restraint or
growth of competitive alternatives for the monopolized services.146 While antitrust litigation
might be directed to achieving this result,147 other options would offer more immediate and
comprehensive relief. For example, state health insurance exchanges or state regulators might
require unbundling on a targeted or across the board basis and CMS pursuant to its review the
performance of ACOs and their impact on commercial markets might impose similar
requirements.148
Another issue amenable to increased regulatory oversight is exclusive contracting by
ACO providers. Preventing exclusive arrangements by dominant providers is a crucial
component of a pro-competitive ACO policy.149 Without it, many ACO would readily achieve
de facto dominance by virtue of their preexisting market power of their key providers, something
that has become commonplace in most markets.150 At the same time, exclusive contracting can
be a vital pro-competitive ingredient where providers do not have market power, as it generally
143
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encourages long term investments of human and financial capital in the enterprise. The Final
Rule conditions safety zone treatment on all any hospital or ambulatory surgery center being
non-exclusive to the ACO.151 The rule of non-exclusivity also applies to rural hospitals or
dominant providers for ACOs that seek to qualify under the rural and dominant provider
exceptions. The test for nonexclusivity, drawn from the Agencies Health Care Policy Statements
is that an ACO must be “non-exclusive in fact and not just in name,” evidenced by a showing
that providers actually individually participate in, or contract with, other networks or managed
care plans; evidence of their willingness and incentive to do so; and evidence that they earn
substantial revenue from other networks or through individual contracts with managed care
plans.152 While these criteria may prove useful in a mature market, it is difficult to see how they
can be applied ex ante in the ACO context.153 A more fruitful approach would be to establish by
regulation preconditions for ACO approval that include clear commitments to participate in other
networks with financial penalties, termination or nonrenewal for noncompliance.
On a more prescriptive path, several options are available. CMS could make more
explicit that it is likely to deny renewal of authority for ACOs to participate in the MSSP where
it finds evidence of spillovers in the form of price increases and cost shifting to the private sector
resulting from market power. Perhaps the boldest move would have been to bar ACOs from
participation in the MSSP that materially increased concentration or threatened to dominate their
markets until entry by other ACOs occurred.154 Faced with delayed entry, providers might then
realign to permit formation of multiple ACOs. Although this approach admittedly imposes short
term losses to the Medicare program, it arguably prevents long term damage to local provider
markets of considerably greater magnitude and duration.155 That is, vertical and horizontal
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consolidation in provider markets stimulated by the MSSP is likely to have adverse effects on
price and quality in private markets without being susceptible to effective antitrust remedies. In
Conclusion
Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes—Oscar Wilde156
Much hangs on the success of the ACO experiment. The Affordable Care Act enjoys only a thin
margin of popular support and has no other tool to spur rapid change in health care delivery. This article
has identified an unfortunate administrative impasse that forestalled a cooperative regulatory approach to
deal with the core issue of provider concentration. Why did a cross platform regulatory solution fail

to emerge? A partial explanation described in this article is found in the divergence between the
legal responsibilities and cultures of the agencies. CMS serves a classically regulatory function,
overseeing quality, price and performance of providers using a variety of entry and command
and control tools, and improvidently ignored the programs effects on private markets. The
antitrust agencies rely largely on adjudicatory enforcement, supplemented by extensive use of
advisory opinions and compliance guidelines. Antitrust enforcers are predisposed to abjure ex
post regulation of the conduct of dominant market participants, preferring ex ante structural
remedies. This mismatch of regulatory perspectives has placed private payors and the Medicare
program at the mercy of dominant providers.
This article has sought to demonstrate that in order to effectively promote competition
through ACOs and prevent harm to private markets it is necessary to police dominant providers,
which in turn requires a degree of prescriptive regulation. Of course it is true that the MSSP is at
the starting point of a learning curve. It is certainly possible that experience and data flowing
from the initial round of ACO contracts will embolden regulators and Congress to undertake
measures that attempt to deal with provider market power. Unfortunately for those who place
their hopes on market solutions to health care costs, the next phase may result in more draconian
regulation than would otherwise have been necessary.
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